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This paper examines how IT influences global sourcing decisions. It develops a theo-
retical model to study how IT determines the decisions of firms located in the high-wage
North whether to offshore production to a low-wage country in the South. Offshoring to
South however is subject to costly communication reflected by partially incomplete con-
tracting. More sophisticated IT allows more efficient communication between the Northern
headquarter and its Southern intermediate input supplier and alleviates contractual fric-
tions. The model provides several predictions about the impact of IT on the organization
of the global supply chain. Complex industries for which codifiability and verifiability of
information is a much harder task, are more likely to source intermediate inputs in coun-
tries with more efficient IT infrastructure. Considering the mode of firm organization,
more efficient IT infrastructure is expected to reduce the share of intra-firm trade in more
complex industries. These predictions are examined and validated using disaggregated
industry-level trade data. Most importantly, these findings are robust to controlling for
well-known sources of comparative advantage and determinants of firm organization such
as factor endowments, financial development and contract enforcement.
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The substantial growth in trade in intermediates throughout the last two decades is widely
considered as a defining feature of the process of globalization. Trade in intermediates occurs
both within and across the boundaries of the firm, as firms fragment production and organize
their production activities on a global scale. As a result, countries do not specialize in the entire
production of final goods but increasingly contribute to overall production by specializing
in specific stages of the production process and providing partitions of value added. This
trend in international vertical specialization and the rise of trade in intermediates has been
subject to a considerable amount of research.1 What lies behind this breaking up of the
production process across borders is the reduction in the costs of offshoring due to revolutionary
advances in information and communication technology. The continuous emergence of more
efficient technologies of information transmission has enabled the expansion of multinational
firms by codifying and communicating complex information in order to transfer technologies
abroad. Nevertheless, international costs of communication still have a profound influence on
the patterns of trade (see Fink, Illeana, and Neagu (2005)). As such, evidence points out that
foreign investment is sensitive to geographic distance and thereby responds strongly to the
costs of international knowledge transfer when making location decisions (see Yeaple (2009)
and Keller and Yeaple (2013)).2 Yet, the forces unleashed by new information technologies
and their impact on the patterns of global sourcing have not been studied so far.
This study examines the impact of the advances of information technology on the organi-
zation of the vertical supply chain. In order to guide empirics, the paper develops a partial
equilibrium model describing the decision of firms located in the high-wage North, whether
to offshore production to a low-wage country in the South. Offshoring to the South however
gives rise to costly communication. The costs of information transmission are reflected by
the amount of contractual distortions which arise when production is offshored. More effi-
1See Campa and Goldberg (1997), Feenstra (1998), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), Hummels, Ishii,
and Yi (2001) and Yeats (2001) amongst others.
2While Yeaple (2009) finds total affiliate sales to decline with distance from the US headquarter, Keller and
Yeaple (2013) explain this finding with increased costs at which heaquarter knowledge can be transferred to
more distant affiliates.
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cient information technology reduces the costs of communication and thereby the degree of
contractual incompleteness. The model illustrates how the propensity to relocate production
to a specific destination country increases with its level of information technology infrastruc-
ture. Assuming that vertical integration is subject to lower costs of communication than
arm’s-length contracting, the model demonstrates how information technology increases the
scale of contracting with indendent input suppliers and thus reduces the share of intra-firm
trade. Since the transmission of complex information relies to a greater extent on successful
codification, the effects of information technology are stronger in more complex industries
characterized by a larger degree of contractual incompleteness. These empirical predictions
are tested and validated using disaggregated trade data on the operations of US industries.
The model draws on the theory of the product cycle by Antràs (2005) and features a world
of two countries, the high-wage North and the low-wage South. A headquarter firm located in
North needs to decide whether to purchase intermediates from a Northern or Southern manu-
facturer in order to produce a final good. Whenever the headquarter firm engages in offshoring
to South, communication costs arise which vary with the degree of complexity of the inter-
mediate input and take the form of additional labor costs. Production processes comprising
complex inputs are assumed to be more susceptible to effective communication. In order to
illustrate the degree of complexity of the intermediate good, the paper introduces partially
incomplete contracting on behalf of the manufacturing firm. Complex intermediates are char-
acterized by a larger portion of complex tasks and activities that cannot be perfectly specified
in a contract. Thus, more complex products and higher costs of communication are reflected
by a greater degree of contractual distortions. More sophisticated information technology, rep-
resented by lower production costs in complex components, alleviates contractual frictions. As
a result, more effective information technology increases incentives of firms to shift production
to South in order to exploit lower wages. Overall, the model predicts industries to be more
likely to import intermediates from countries with a higher level of information technology
where the effect is supposed to be increasing in product complexity.
Next, the model deals with the impact of information technology on the organization of
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the multinational firm. Following the property-rights approach, asset ownership determines
the bargaining power throughout ex-post renegotiation and determines the ex-ante incentives
of each party to invest. Outsourcing provides the manufacturer with larger incentives to invest
but is related to larger costs of communication than integration. When deciding about the
optimal mode of organization, the headquarter firm therefore has to trade off the contractual
distortions arising due to costly information transmission with outsourcing and the incentives
provided to the manufacturing firm. More effective information technology reduces the scale
of communication costs and increases the incentives to opt for independent subcontracting.
Again, this effect is stronger for more complex inputs.
The model’s predictions are tested in the empirical section of the paper. The main measure
for the adoption of information technology is based on the international internet bandwidth
by country.3 Product complexity at the industry level is measured by making use of task
level data. Production processes that require more complex and non-routine activities in-
volve less codifiable information thereby implying higher costs of knowledge transmission. I
therefore use data on the specific work activities in each industry in order to estimate the
intensity with which a sector employs non-routine tasks in the production process. Evidence
of the impact of information technology on the geography of offshoring is based on the num-
ber of intermediate goods by industry that the US imports from South. In order to assess
the impact on the mode of organization, I use data on the share of intra-firm imports as a
fraction of total Southern imports to the US.4 Since the empirical predictions relate to the
interaction of information technology infrastructure and product complexity, the estimations
follow a generalized difference-in-differences strategy including sector fixed effects as well as
country-year-fixed effects. Identification is therefore with respect to within country variation
across industries. This approach allows restricting the set of controls to variables which influ-
ence the level of information technology infrastructure as well as the intensity in non-routine
tasks and might affect sourcing strategies of US firms. In line with the empirical prediction,
the econometric analysis shows that the impact of information technology on the number of
3More precisely, I use the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user.
4A country is defined as Southern if GDP per capita (at PPP) is lower than 50% of the US level in the year
2000.
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imported intermediates is increasing with product complexity. In addition, the share of intra-
firm imports decreases with the level of information technology with the effect being strongest
for more complex industries. Comparing two industries that differ in one standard deviation
in terms of product complexity, a one standard deviation change in information technology
yields a positive differential effect of 2, 35% in the number of imported intermediates and a
negative differential effect of 1, 11 percentage points in the share of intra-firm trade. These re-
sults are robust to well known determinants of offshoring, multinational firm organization and
the patterns of specialization. Amongst others, effects remain significant when controlling for
factor endowments as well as for institutional determinants such as financial development or
judicial quality. Moreover, results are robust to the inclusion of measures for overall economic
development as well as trade openness. Additionally, several robustness checks are performed
in order to validate the results. Results hold when using alternative measures of information
technology adoption as well as when employing alternative estimation techniques. Besides, I
replace my measure of product complexity with an alternative measure reflecting the intensity
in routine tasks by industry. Consistent with the predictions, the coefficients point to a reverse
pattern with the effect of information technology decreasing in routine intensity.
The paper relates to several literatures. Firstly, the paper contributes to the literature
on the costs of international knowledge transfer and the organization of knowledge in multi-
nationals. Keller and Yeaple (2013) find large barriers for US multinationals to transferring
knowledge from headquarter to affiliate. Similarly, Oldenski (2012b) finds US multinationals
to be more likely to offshore production stages abroad the more intensively they employ rou-
tine tasks and the less intensively they are in communication. Moreover, Costinot, Oldenski,
and Rauch (2011) identify the non-routine quality of production tasks as a source of contrac-
tual frictions between the multinational headquarter and its supplier. Their results show that
intra-firm trade tends to be decreasing in more routine intensive industries. Antràs, Garicano,
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) study the organization of knowledge in cross-country teams and
Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) consider the interaction of host country com-
munication technology and human capital. Secondly, the paper relates to the literature on the
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determinants of global sourcing. Whereas previous literature concentrates on the impact of
intellectual property rights (e.g. Ethier and Markusen (1996) and Javorcik (2004)), financial
development (e.g. Carluccio and Fally (2012)), factor intensities (e.g. Antràs (2003)) and
contract enforcement (e.g. Antràs and Helpman (2008) and Nunn and Trefler (2008, 2013))
I focus on the role of digitization in altering the global sourcing decisions of multinationals.
Besides, the paper is based on a large literature which introduces the property-rights theory of
the firm to international trade theory in order to study the organization of multinationals (e.g.
Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Antràs (2005)).5 Thirdly, several researchers have addressed
the effect of the internet on trade flows. Freund and Weinhold (2002, 2004) assess the impact
of the internet on international trade in services and goods. Higher internet penetration is
associated with both, an increase in growth in services and bilateral goods trade. Ultimately,
my paper is also related to the literature on the economic consequences of information and
communication technology. Abramovsky and Griffith (2006) consider the role of information
and communication technology in outsourcing and offshoring of business services. Bloom,
Garicano, Sadun, and van Reenen (2014) deal with the differential impact of information
and communication technology on the autonomy of employees within firms and Baker and
Hubbard (2003, 2004) analyze the impact of the adoption of new information technologies
on organizational changes in the trucking industry. This paper aims to contribute to these
various strands of literature by studying how the advances in information technology affect
the organization of the multinational firm along the global supply chain.
Section 2 introduces a simple model of offshoring and the role of information technology.
Section 3 presents the data, the empirical strategy and the results of the econometric analysis.
Section 4 offers some concluding comments.
5See Antràs (2013) and Antràs and Yeaple (2015) for a survey about the literature on incomplete contracts
and the organization of multinational firms.
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2 A Simple Model of Information Technology and Global Sourc-
ing
2.1 Setup
Based on the theory of the product cycle by Antràs (2005), this section develops a simple
partial equilibrium model in which contractual frictions illustrate how information technology
determines the offshoring decisions of Northern firms and affects the international organization
of production.
The world consists of two countries, North and South. Labor is the only factor of produc-
tion in order to produce a single good y and cannot move across borders. The wage rate in
the North is denoted by wNand in the South by wS . Throughout the model, wages in North
are higher than in the South wN > wS .
2.1.1 Preferences











dj, 0 < α < 1. (1)
Total consumption of variety i in industry j is given by yj(i). N is the number of industries
in the economy and nj is the number of varieties in industry j. Varieties enter the utility
function symmetrically with an elasticity of substitution equal to ǫ = 1/(1−α). The elasiticty













where pj(i) is the price and λj is a function of total income and an aggregate price index
taken as given by the consumer.
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2.1.2 Production
Consider the production process of a final good i in industry j. Production of any final good
yj(i) consists of two steps: It requires the provision of headquarter services such as engineering
and marketing represented by a special and distinct high-tech input h, and it necessitates
final assembly and production described by a special and distinct low-tech input m, provided
by a manufacturing firm. It is assumed that the headquarter engages in a contract with


















, 0 ≤ zj ≤ 1, (3)
where the parameter zj describes the output elasticity of the manufacturing process m
of the final good. The relative intensity of manufacuring zj can also be interpreted as the
degree of standardization of the final good in industry j. The larger zj , the less significant are
headquarter activities such as engineering and other problem solving services and the more
standardized the good is. Production of one unit of a high-tech input requires the employment
of one unit of Northern labor. The South however, is much less efficient at producing the high-
tech input. By assumption, the productivity advantage of the North is sufficiently high enough
to ensure that headquarter services are always located in the North. Labor requirements for
the production of one unit of low-tech input are assumed to be equal to 1 in both North and
South. High- and low-tech input are relationship-specific and have to fit precisely the needs of
its counterpart, otherwise no positive output can be produced.6 In order to focus on the impact
of information technology and communication costs on the provision of inputs, headquarter
services h are not subject to costly transmission of information and fully non-contractible.
The specialized manufacturing input m is produced with a set of activites indexed by points
on the interval [0, 1].7 Activities related to input m(s) in the range [0, µs] where 0 ≤ µs≤ 1 are
6An input designed to fit with a particular headquarter or manufacturing firm cannot be employed in the
production of other varieties. Therefore, they are useless outside the relationship.
7See Antràs and Helpman (2008) and Acemoglu, Antràs, and Helpman (2007).
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considered as basic tasks which are fully contractible. Activities in the fraction (µs, 1] represent
complex tasks wich are non-contractible and due to a hold-up problem when investment costs
are already sunk. Complex tasks may be either of good or bad quality which cannot be verified
ex-ante. If they are of bad quality, total output of the final good y is zero. The nature of non-
contractible activities is only resolved when investments are already made. If non-contractible
investments are of bad quality, production costs can be neglected. Both inputs h and m can
be freely traded and no transport costs accrue. Altogether, the parties engage in a partially
incomplete contract leading to a two-sided hold-up problem. Thus they need to bargain about
the joint surplus created by the relationship.
In order to successfully implement final assembly of the final good engineered by the head-
quarter firm, both parties need to communicate. As a result communication costs Γ > 1 arise.
So as to reflect the fact that international production sharing is associated with higher costs
of communication than domestic fragmentation, it is assumed that communication costs only
occur if the manufacturing firm is located in South. Communication costs Γ however are only
related to the set of complex and non-contractible activities (µs, 1] on behalf of the manufac-
turer. Following Keller and Yeaple (2013) communication costs Γ take the form of additional
labor requirements in Southern labor and are incurred by the Southern manufacturer. Higher
costs of communication result in a less efficient production process associated with larger costs
expressed as larger labor requirements. Most importantly, I assume that more sophisticated
information technology reduces the costs of communication and coordination Γ.
Before a headquarter decides to produce a high-tech input it needs to decide whether to
engage in a relationship with a manufacturing firm located in the North or to opt for an inter-
national fragmentation of the production process and contract with a manufacturing firm in
the South. The timing of events characterizing the contract is the following: The headquarter
first offers potential manufacturing firms a contract defining the manufacturer’s required in-
vestment in contractible activities {m(s)}µ0 and an upfront lump-sum transfer T .
8 Hence, the
contract stipulates the investment levels for the contractible activities but does not specify the
investment levels in the remaining (1−µ) non-contractible activities. The manufacturing firm
8The transfer T can be either positive or negative.
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may therefore choose to withhold its services in these activites from the headquarter firm. By
assumption, there is a large pool of potential applicants, such that competition among them
makes T adjust such that the final manufacturing firm exactly breaks even. The ex-ante out-
side option of manufacturing firms is normalized to zero in both countries. Subsequently, the
manufacturer chooses its investment level in contractible activities and both, the headquarter
and the manufacturer independently decide about their non-contractible investments h and
m(s) where s ∈ (µ, 1]. Ultimately, the resulting output is sold, and the Nash bargaining leaves
each party with one-half of the revenues (i.e. the quasi-rents).
By assumption, the setting is one of complete contracts if the manufacturing firm is located
in the North.9 However, the relationship turns into an partially incomplete contract in case of
international fragmentation of production.10 The headquarter decides whether to engage with
a manufacturing firm in North or South by maximizing its ex-ante expected profits. Whenever
manufacturing takes place in the South the two parties bargain over the surplus after inputs
have been produced. Following Antràs (2005) the parties conduct ex post symmetric Nash
bargaining and equally share the rents created by the relationship. If the parties fail to agree
on the bargaining outcome, both receive nothing.
Overall, costs of international fragmentation are incorporated by contractual frictions
which mirror the imperfect transmission of information across borders. More efficient in-
formation technology reflected by lower costs of communication Γ reduces these distortions.
2.2 Partial Equilibrium
This section considers the choice of the final-good producer of variety i in industry j whether to
source inputs from an independent supplier located in North or South. As noted earlier, wages
in South are assumed to be lower than in the North wN > wS . However, whenever production
occurs in South, contracts are partially incomplete and communication costs occur.
9Whenever the manufacturing stage is located in the North it is assumed that the headquarter firm can
hire an outside party in order to enforce a quality-contingent contract which monitors the ex-ante investments
in non-contractible investments h and m(s) where s ∈ (µ, 1].
10If international production sharing occurs, no third party can observe whether the inputs provided are
of good or bad quality and no quality-contingent contract can be written. Likewise, no outside party can
control the size of ex ante investments of the manufacturing firm and no contracts can be written contingent
on revenues earned when the final good is sold.
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2.2.1 Production by a Manufacturing Firm in the North
If the headquarter decides to fragment production domestically and engage in a relationship
with a Northern manufacturer, both parties can write a complete contract.11 The contract
stipulates production levels of headquarter and manufacturing services such that the head-
quarter’s ex-ante profits are maximized. Considering the transfer T , the headquarter’s profits
are given by πN (z) = λ1−α (h/1−z)α(1−z) · (m/z)αz − hwN −mwN . Maximizing with respect to
h and m results in ex-ante profits for the headquarter given by






2.2.2 Production by a Manufacturing Firm in the South
Whenever transaction occurs between a Northern headquarter and a manufacturer in the
South, the contract stipulates the investment levels in contractible activities m(s), s ∈ [0, µ],
and the lump-sum transfer T . Overall, if non-contractible inputs are of good-quality, and
bargaining does not fail, revenues are given by R = λ1−α (h/1−z)α(1−z) · (m/z)αz. Due to
relationship-specificity, the inputs have no value outside the relationship and the outside option
of every player is zero. Therefore, if bargainig fails, output is zero and so are revenues.
Symmetric Nash bargaining gives each party its outside option plus one-half of the ex-post
gains from the relationship (i.e. the difference between the sum of the player’s payoff under
trade and their sum under no trade). The payoffs of the headquarter firm and the manufacturer
are therefore given by 0.5R.12 Since both parties do not capture the full surplus created by
the relationship, this induces both parties to underinvest relative to a setting with Northern
manufacturing and complete contracts. The game is solved by backwards induction. Rolling
back in time, the headquarter and manufacturing firms first choose their investment levels in
non-contractible activities. The firms’ optimization problems are given by
11Complete contracts are not subject to ex-post renegotiation since investment levels in headquarter h and
complex manufacturing activities m (s), s ∈ (µ, 1], are specified and can be controlled by a third party.









































subject to contractible investments m(s), s ∈ [0, µ]. The first order conditions can be simplified









Obviously, larger costs of communication Γ create an additional distortion and reduce the
amount of investment in complex activities of the manufacturing firm.
From there, the amount of revenues given contractible investment levels can be calculated and
one can solve for investments in non-contractible activities on behalf of the headquarter h and












































Larger costs of communication Γ lower the investments in complex tasks of the manu-
facturing firm and reduce joint revenues. This gives rise to a negative feedback effect on
headquarter activities which equally drop due to the presence of costly communication. The
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distortion created by costly information transmission declines with the range of basic activi-
ties µ and increases with the range of complex activities (1− µ). The contract offered by the









m(s)ds+ T ≥ 0, (11)
where non-contractible activities in the range (1−µ) are given by equation (9) and contractible
investments h and m(s), s ∈ [0, µ], are as specified in the contract. The headquarter in turn
maximizes its payoff
0.5R− wNh− T , s ∈ (µ, 1]. (12)
The transfer T is set such that the manufacturer exactly breaks even and its participation
constraint is binding. For this reason, the optimization problem of the headquarter firm with
respect to contractible manufacturing investments reduces to
max
{m(s)}1µ









Combining this with non-contractible activities given in equation (9) and (10) one can solve
for contractible investments on behalf of the manufacturing firm and derive profits. Profits of
the headquarter are finally equal to













where θ = (1− µz). Profits decline with less efficient information technology Γ. This effect
is larger for more standardized production processes relying to a greater extent on efficient
manufacturing and for intermediates containing a larger fraction of complex investments.
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2.3 Information Technology and Offshoring
When deciding whether to produce in North or South, the headquarter firm has to trade off the
benefits of free information transmission in North with the costly information transmission in
South for a given wage differential between both regions. By comparing profits of Northern and
Southern manufacturing it follows that the headquarter will decide to purchase the low-tech









Γ(1−µ) ≡ A(z, µ,Γ). (15)
It can be shown that A(z, µ,Γ) is decreasing in the degree of standardization z with lim
z→0
A(z, µ,Γ) =
+∞ and A(1, µ,Γ) > 1. If wages in North are larger than in South wN > wS , a threshold level
of standardization z ∈ (0, 1) arises: As long as z < z ≡ A−1(ω, µ,Γ) final assembly is located
in the North. If z > z≡ A−1O (ω, µ,Γ) holds, final assembly takes place in the South. Hence,
only when the final good is sufficiently standardized and the manufacturing stage sufficiently
important in production, lower wages in the South are able to outweigh contractual frictions




specific threshold level z of standardization increases with larger costs of communication Γ.
This effect is stronger for final goods which exhibit a larger range of complex activities m(s),
s ∈ (µ, 1].
2.4 Information Technology and the Mode of Firm Organization
Given that the final good producer decides to produce in South, it may now integrate the
manufacturing firm and engage in FDI. Consider the same setup as in the previous section.
However, it is now assumed that communication costs do not arise in case of vertical inte-
gration whereas contracting with an independent manufacturer in South is subject to costly
communication.14 This assumption is meant to reflect that offshoring is connected with less
13Note that if wages were identical in North and South, manufacturing would always take place in North.
14See Defever and Toubal (2013) for recent research in international trade wich combines the incomplete
contracting approach to the theory of the firm with similar key elements of the transaction cost approach by
Williamson (1985).
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efficient communication if the headquarter opts for outsourcing than in case of integration.
This can be justified, as whenever production of intermediates occurs within the boundaries
of the firm, the headquarter may fully exert control over the Southern manufacturer and thus
align the modes of communication in North and South. It may for instance substitute man-
agers in South by managers from North and improve the efficiency of knowledge transmission.
Ownership dictates the residual rights of control over assets. As given in Antràs (2005), if the
manager of the manufacturing plant refuses to trade after investments have been conducted,
the headquarter manager may fire the manager in South and take possession of the amount
of intermediates produced by the manufacturing plant. Failed bargaining is costly and firing
the manufacturing manager is associated with a loss in the amount of the output produced
equal to (1 − δ)y with δ < 1. The final good producer can then only generate sale revenues
equal to δαR. This yields quasi rents given by (1− δα)R. Consequently, the headquarter firm
chooses its optimal investment level with respect to anticipated revenues 0.5(1+δα)R whereas
the manufacturing firm sets basic and complex investments with respect to 0.5(1− δα)R. Ac-
cordingly, outsourcing provides the manufacturing firm with a larger share of the joint surplus
(0.5R > 0.5(1 − δα)R) for which reason it faces larger incentives to invest in the joint rela-
tionship than with integration. Therefore, ex ante efficiency requires to prefer outsourcing
over integration whenever the manufacturing firm becomes relatively more important in the
production process (i.e. z increases).15 This however relates to additional distortions due
to costly information transmission which in turn gives advantage to integration. Solving the
game along the lines of section 2.2 yields profits of the headquarter firm given by












with △ = [1− α0.5 (θ + δα (1− z (2− µ)))] and θ = (1− µz). Thus, the headquarter firm
15The reverse pattern holds for the headquarter firm which faces a larger fraction of the joint surplus
under integration compared to outsourcing (0.5 (1 + δα)R > 0.5R). The headquarter firm therefore has larger
incentives to invest if both parties integrate. Thus, ex ante efficiency implies that integration is preferred over
outsourcing if the headquarter firm is relatively more important in the relationship (i.e. z is low).
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has to trade off the efficiency loss due to costly information transmission with the level of
incentives provided to the manufacturing firm when choosing between integration and arm’s-
length contracting. The trade-off is governed by the relative importance of the manufacturing
firm and the costs of information transmission. An increase in the relative importance of
the manufacturer favors outsourcing whereas larger costs of information transmission promote
integration. This effect is exacerbated by a wider range of complex activities. Considering
the choice between offshoring via FDI and arm’s-length contracting, it can be inferred that
production of intermediates will take place in South within the boundaries of the firm whenever
πV I > πO. This can also be written as
A∗(z, µ,Γ) ≡
(




Γ1−µ ≥ 1. (17)
A∗(z, µ,Γ) is decreasing in the manufacturing intensity z with limz→0A
∗(z, µ,Γ) = +∞ and
A∗(1, µ,Γ) > 1 for all z ∈ (0, 1). Hence a cutoff z∗ ∈ (0, 1) arises. Whenever z < z∗ the
headquarter opts for integration. If the manufacturing firm is sufficiently important in the
production process and z > z∗ the headquarter prefers outsourcing.
2.5 Empirical Predictions
The impact of information technology in the partial equilibrium model has direct implications
for the optimal sourcing strategies of industries. In the first instance firms offshore produc-
tion in order to exploit differences in labor costs across countries. The model alludes that
the overall pattern of offshoring might be affected by the necessity to transmit information
between the headquarter in North and its manufacturing counterpart in South. Hence, by
considering varying degrees of complexity across industries, the model illustrates how infor-
mation technology leads to differential effects across industries which depend to a different
extent on knowledge transmission.
Consider now the impact of information technology on the choice whether to source inputs
in South in equation (15). Taking the derivatives of the log of the A(z, µ,Γ)-curve with respect








Hence, an increase in the costs of communication Γ shifts the A(z, µ,Γ)-curve to the right
as for any given relative wage w
N
wS
industries shift production to the South only at a higher
level of relative importance of the manufacturing firm z (i.e. a later stage of standardization).
This effect is dampened, the larger the range of basic activities µ and the smaller the range
of complex activities (1 − µ) in an industry. Overall, considering an increase in the costs of
communication, the new equilibrium threshold level z̄ at which offshoring occurs has increased.
Considering the reverse case of more efficient information technology: A reduction in the cost
of communication and coordination reduces the cutoff level z at which an industry offshores
production to the South. More efficient information transmission alleviates contractual fric-
tions in South and thereby permits international fragmentation of production at lower levels
of manufacturing intensity z.16 Figure 1 depicts the impact of an increase in the efficiency
of information technology Γ′ < Γ for a varying degree of product complexity µ
◦
< µ on the
cutoff level z at which an industry starts to offshore production. A reduction in the costs of
communication Γ′ < Γ shifts the A(z, µ,Γ)-curve to the left and lowers the cutoff level z̄. This
effect however is stronger for the more complex industry characterized by a smaller fraction of
contractible activities µ
◦
< µ. By emphasizing differences in complexity across industries and
differences in information technology infrastructure across countries, the model can be used
to derive a prediction about the geography of offshoring.
Prediction 1 Industries are more likely to import inputs from a country with a higher level
of information technology infrastructure. This effect is more pronounced for more complex
industries.
Turning towards the mode of firm organization, less sophisticated information technology
increases the costs of outsourcing and favors vertical integration. Since costly communication
16An alternative interpretation would be that more efficient information technology allows for international
fragmentation of production at an earlier stage of the life cycle of a product. Thus, advances in information
technology shift comparative advantage in manufacturing from North to South and speed up the product cycle.
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applies only to the complex fraction of inputs, this effect drops with the level of basic activities







Hence, the cutoff level of standardization z∗ at which firms adapt their mode of organization
increases and more firms purchase intermediate inputs within the boundaries of the firm.
Figure 2 displays the reverse case of an increase in the efficiency of information technology
Γ′ < Γ. More efficient information technology reduces the costs of outsourcing and shifts
the A∗(z, µ,Γ)-curve to the left. Thus, distortions created by information transmission are
reduced for which reason outsourcing becomes the more viable mode of organization at even
lower levels of importance of the manufacturing process z. Again, the effect is stronger for the
more complex industry featuring a smaller fraction of contractible activities µ
◦
< µ as a larger
range of complex activities reinforces the distortions of costly communication. From there I
can conclude:
Prediction 2 Outsourcing is more likely to occur in countries with a higher level of infor-
mation technology infrastructure. This effect is more pronounced for more complex industries.
3 Empirical Evidence
This section first describes the data used to test the predictions of the model. Subsequently,
I assess how information technology determines the geography of offshoring. Last, I estimate
the impact of information technology on the sourcing mode. Several robustness checks are
included within each of the empirical sections. Testing the empirical predictions requires in
first instance data on North-South vertical offshoring, the degree of product complexity and




Estimations with respect to the geography of offshoring (Prediction 1) are based on trade
data provided by the NBER.17 This data provides a detailed documentation of the entire set
of industries and countries exporting to the US up to the 10-digit level of the Harmonized
System (HS). In order to focus on North-South trade and follow the setup of the model, I
restrict the set of trading partners to countries located in the South, where I follow Romalis
(2004) and define the South to be any country with per capita GDP (at PPP) lower than 50%
of the US level in the year 2000. In addition, so as to measure vertical offshoring and trade in
intermediates, I make use of the end-use classification established by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and drop all final goods and raw materials following Feenstra and Jensen (2012). The
proxy variable to model the geography of offshoring is given by the number of intermediate
goods per industry that a country exports to the US. This is because in the model Prediction
1 and the geography of imports captures the extensive margin of offshoring. A good is defined
as a 5-digit SITC category and an industry is classified by a 4-digit NAICS category.18 The
focus of the analysis is on the years 2002 - 2006.
Estimation of the impact of information technology on firm organization (Prediction 2)
is based on related party trade data collected by the US Census Bureau. US cross-border
shipments are required to report whether a transaction occurs between related parties such
that the data covers almost the entire universe of related party shipments. The data reports
both, the scale of related party (intra-firm) and non-related party (arm’s-length) US imports.
A related party transaction is defined as a transaction between two parties in which one owns
at least 6% of the outstanding voting stock or shares of its counterpart. A shortcoming of
the data is that it is not possible to infer whether the US importer is a US parent firm or a
foreign-based affiliate. Nunn and Trefler (2013) investigate all headquarter-subsidiary pairs for
17See Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002).
18See Basco (2013) for recent research using a similar approach in order to quantify the number of imported
goods by industry. In the econometric analysis industry fixed effects control for the fact that the number of
goods may be varying in different industries.
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global multinationals for which the headquarter firm or the subsidiary are from the US. They
find that for a large range of countries the US can commonly be considered as the headquarter.
Moreover, countries for which this turns out not to be the case are mostly developed countries.
Therefore, once more I concentrate on North-South trade and drop all trading partners if per
capita GDP (at PPP) is lower than 50% of the US level in the year 2000. I follow Nunn and
Trefler (2008, 2013) and Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2010) and compute the share
of related party imports by industry and country to the US in order to measure the degree of
vertical integration of the offshoring activities of an industry. Alternatively, for the purpose
of further robustness tests, I construct a dummy variable which indicates whether the share
of intra-firm trade is above the 90% percentile of the distribution. Estimation is again at the
4-digit NAICS level and for the years 2002 - 2006.
3.1.2 Country Variables
The level and efficiency of information technology infrastructure is measured by the interna-
tional internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user derived from the ICT indicators database
provided by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). International internet band-
width refers to the capacity that backbone operators provide to carry internet traffic. As such,
the international bandwidth represents the maximum quantity of data transmission from a
country to the rest of the world. An internet connection with a larger bandwidth can move a
given amount of data much faster than an internet connection with a lower bandwidth. Thus,
countries with a higher international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user are char-
acterized by a more efficient information technology infrastructure.19 Table 4 in the appendix
presents the top and bottom 10 countries in information technology infrastructure in the data.
In my robustness tests I also employ various alternative measures of information technology
adoption. First of all, I rescale the level of international internet bandwidth (bit/s) with the
population in order to account for country size. Moreover, I directly exploit the share of
internet users per 100 people (ITU) as well as the number of secure internet servers per 1 mil-
19This approach is similar to Freund and Weinhold (2002, 2004) who use the number of top-level host domain
names in order measure the adoption of information technology at the country level.
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lion people (World Bank). While internet users provide extensive information about internet
adoption in developing countries, secure servers protect data from unauthorized interception
and reflect the security level of online transactions within the local information technology
network.
I introduce several controls in order to take account of prior research on the determinants
of offshoring. There is a considerable amount of research which studies the role of financial
frictions on trade and investment. Carluccio and Fally (2012) study the impact of access
to external finance on French multinationals and find evidence, that financial development
provides comparative advantage in the supply of complex products and promotes arm’s-length
contracting relative to intra-firm imports. Similar evidence has been produced by Beck (2003)
and Manova (2013) who demonstrate how financial frictions act as a source of comparative
advantage and affect firms’ export decisions at the micro-level. I follow the literature and
concentrate on the share of financial resources provided to the private sector (i.e. loans,
nonequity securities, trade credits) as a share of GDP. The variable is procured from the
Global Financial Development Database provided by the World Bank.
Similarly, a related strand of literature emphasizes the quality of the contracting environ-
ment (’rule of law’) as a further source of comparative advantage and determinant of multina-
tionals’ organization. Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007) find that the quality of a country’s
legal system provides comparative advantage in contract intensive industries. According to
Antràs and Helpman (2008) judicial quality also affects the decision whether to integrate the
foreign production facility. The measure for the rule of law is taken from Kaufmann, Kraay,
and Mastruzzi (2010). I also control for the level of intellectual property rights since firms
might refrain from offshoring and outsourcing sensitive production processes in countries fea-
turing little protection of intellectual property.20 The index of patent protection is drawn from
Ginarte and Park (1997, 2008).
Next, using data from Hall and Jones (1999) I take account of traditional trade theory and
control for factor endowments as determinant of comparative advantage.21 Moreover, in order
20See e.g. Ethier and Markusen (1996).
21See Romalis (2004) for recent evidence.
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to control for a country’s degree of integration into global trade, I use the sum of imports and
exports over GDP as measure of openness. Finally, the overall level of economic development
is considered by the level of GDP per capita (at PPP). Both variables are drawn from the
Word Development Indicators (World Bank).
3.1.3 Industry Variables
The measure for the costs of knowledge transmission and product complexity is based on task
level data. Production processes that are based on more complicated activities (i.e. non-
routine tasks) are subject to less codifiable information and exhibit higher costs of knowledge
transmission between the headquarter and the manufacturing firm. Therefore, they rely to
a larger extent on efficient information technology. In the model, more complex production
processes being subject to more costly transmission of information, are reflected by non-
contractible inputs. Information technology is supposed to ease knowledge transmission and
to reduce the inefficiencies generated by contractual incompleteness. I follow the construction
of task intensities by Oldenski (2012a,b). Raw data on tasks is taken from the Department of
Labor’s Occupational Information Network (O*NET) which comprises data on the importance
of 277 worker and job characteristics in about 800 occupations. The O*NET data distinguishes
between seven broad categories of worker and job characteristics given by abilities, interests,
knowledge, skills, work activities, work context and work values. I follow Oldenski (2012a,b)
and focus on work activities. So as to match the relevant task measures to the industry level
trade data, I aggregate the raw O*NET scores up to the 4-digit NAICS level by combining
them with employment data from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) provided





where o denotes occupations and αso is the share of occupation o in an industry s. ℓio in
22The O*NET dataset and the occupational employment shares by the Bureau of Labor Statistics both use
6-digit SOC codes such that both datasources can be combined without any concordance problems.
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turn measures the importance of task i in occupation o.23 Summing over occupations for a
given industry yields Mis which is an index for the unscaled importance score for a task i in
industry s. Ultimately, each raw score is then divided by the sum of scores for each task. This






Since offshoring activities might likewise influence the task composition of industries, the
measure is constructed for the year 2000 which precedes the panel data under investigation.
Subsequently, I create a measure of complexity (i.e. non-routine intensity) by computing the
average task intensity of ’analyzing data and information’, ’developing objectives and strate-
gies’, ’interacting with computers’, ’making decisions and solving problems’, ’provide consul-
tation and advice’ and ’thinking creatively’. This procedure is akin to Oldenski (2012a,b).
The basic idea is to capture tasks that are sufficiently complex such that they exhibit a low
degree of codifiability and high costs of information transmission thereby making the use of
information technology more valuable. In order to conduct further robustness checks I also
construct a measure of routine intensity by building the average intensity of ’handling and
moving objects’, ’controlling machines and processes’ and ’performing general physical activ-
ities’. Table 5 in the appendix displays the correlations between the task intensities and the
measures for complexity and routine intensity. As expected, the measures for routine intensive
and non-routine intensive tasks are highly negatively correlated.
Moreover, I control for R&D intensity as additional proxy for product complexity. R&D
intensity is given by R&D expenditures over sales and taken from Keller and Yeaple (2013).
Additionally, I also employ a dummy variable indicating whether an industry represents a high-
technology sector. The variable is derived from the Science and Engineering Indicators 2010
by the National Science Foundation and based on the intensity of high-technology employment
within an industry. Furthermore, I include data on a sector’s contract intensity as developed
23ℓiois a 0−100 score reported by O*NET in order to measure the importance of each task in each occupation.
The data is derived from surveys of individuals in different occupations and normalized to a 0− 100 scale by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
23
by Nunn (2007). The variable measures the importance of relationship-specific investments
based on the proportion of inputs an industry processes which are not sold on markets or
organized exchanges. Thus, an industry which uses a smaller fraction of inputs which are
traded on markets exhibits a higher degree of relationship-specificity and is considered more
contract intensive.24
Ultimately, I control for the skill and capital intensity of industries by using data from
the NBER CES Manufacturing Industry Database. Skill intensity is defined as the share of
non-production workers in total employment and capital intensity is measured as the capital
stock per employee.
3.2 Information Technology and the Geography of Imports
3.2.1 Empirical Strategy and Results
Next, I turn towards the impact of information technology infrastructure on the location choice
of Northern firms where to purchase intermediates in South. Following Prediction 1, industries
are expected to prefer to source inputs from countries providing more sophisticated information
technology infrastructure. This effect should increase with the level of product complexity.
This implies a difference-in-differences approach.25 The dependent variable is the number of
goods imported to the US by a given industry from a specific country. For this reason I run
a count data regression based on a negative binomial distribution. In contrast to the Poisson
regression, the negative binomial regression allows for overdispersion and does not assume
that the mean and variance coincide.26 Moreover, I follow Allison and Waterman (2002) who
recommend to estimate an unconditional negative binomial regression with dummy variables
24I focus on the proportion of inputs of products that are not traded on organized exchanges (differentiated)
but which might be reference priced based on the liberal classification of commodities into organized exchange,
reference priced, and differentiated by Rauch (1999).
25This generalized difference-in-differences approach has been pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998).
26The Poisson distribution can be considered as a particular case of the negative binomial distribution (see
Cameron and Trivedi (2009), Ch. 20 for further explanation).
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in order to take account of fixed effects.2728 This yields the following estimation equation
E [Ncst|Xcst] = exp
[
β1 × complexitys × ITct +X
′
cst
γ + µs + ηct + εcst
]
. (22)
The number of goods Ncst imported from country c by industry s in year t is regressed
on the interaction of sectoral product complexity complexitys and the level of information
technology ITct reflected by the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user in
country c in year t. The focus of the empirical strategy is on the interaction terms. Therefore,
I include country-year fixed effects ηct that control for country characteristics in a given year
that might affect sourcing activities by US industries. In addition, I also control for sector
characteristics with sector fixed-effects µs. Hence, identification of the coefficient of interest
β1 is across industries and within countries for a given year. The fixed-effects capture the
direct effects of the country and industry level variables for which reason the empirical strategy
mainly requires to control for variables Xcst that might affect the level of international internet
bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user and that might likewise be correlated with the degree of
complexity of industries. According to Prediction 1, if information technology influences the
decision of firms where to source inputs, the number of imported goods should increase with
the complexity of the industry. Thus, the coefficient of interest is expected to be positive.
The regressions are based on standard erros which are clustered at the country level. Besides,
taking logs on both sides of the estimation equation allows to interpret the coefficients as
semi-elasticities.29
Table 1 reports the estimation results. Column (1) presents the baseline equation: The
international internet bandwith (kbit/s) per internet user is interacted with the measure of
complexity which is given by the intensity in non-routine tasks by industry. Consistent with
Prediction 1, the coefficient is positive and highly significant. Thus, firms relying to a larger
27Allison and Waterman (2002) find in their simulations that an unconditional negative binomial regres-
sion with dummy variables does not underestimate the standard errors and create the incidental parameters
problem.
28This approach is similar to Carluccio and Fally (2012) who estimate the impact of financial development
and product complexity on the number of multinationals which source intermediates from a specific country.
29Taking logs implies that the coefficients reflect the impact of the explanatory variables on the log of the
expected number of imported goods.
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negative binomial regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: number of imported goods
complexitys * ITct 0.0611*** 0.0445** 0.0311* 0.0356** 0.0329**
(0.0180) (0.0175) (0.0184) (0.0144) (0.0138)
R&D ints * fin devtct -0.000211
(0.000835)
high-techs * patent protc 0.137*
(0.0782)
contract ints * rule of lawct 1.636**
(0.738)
complexitys * H/Lc 0.816*
(0.459)
complexitys * K/Lc -0.00894
(0.0577)
complexitys * cgdpct 6.02e-06
(7.00e-06)
complexitys * opennessct 0.00376***
(0.000974)
skill ints * H/Lc 1.122* 0.574 -0.584 0.442
(0.642) (0.809) (1.190) (0.733)
capital ints * K/Lc 0.246 0.231 0.271 0.255
(0.290) (0.297) (0.301) (0.292)
alpha 0.0903 0.0877 0.0855 0.0877 0.0867
sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
country-year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 10,014 9,573 9,276 9,573 9,556
log likelihood -20,942 -20,128 -19,629 -20,119 -20,070
country clusters 86 76 68 76 76
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country. The dependent variable is the number
of imported goods. The coefficient of interest is the interaction of complexity at the sector
level complexitys and the level of information technology infrastructure at the country-year
level IT ct . Information technology infrastructure is measured by the international internet
bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user. Complexity is measured by the intensity in non-routine
tasks by industry (see section 3.1.3 for detailed explanations). For a definition of the covariates
see Table 12. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1: Prediction 1 - Impact of Information Technology and Complexity on the
Geography of Imports
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extent on knowledge transmission are more likely to invest in countries with better informa-
tion technology infrastructure. In the following regressions, I subsequently add several control
variables which affect multinationals’ sourcing decisions and might be correlated with both,
the level of information technology as well as complexity. In column (2) I start with capital
and skill endowments which are interacted with capital and skill intensity in order to control
for Heckscher-Ohlin effects. This results in a drop in the size of the coefficient of interest
which nevertheless remains highly significant. Consistent with traditional trade theory, the
interaction of skill intensity and skill endowment is positive and significant. This however
is not the case for the capital endowment and capital intensity interaction. Further control
variables in column (3) include interactions of financial development and the protection of
intellectual property rights with R&D intensity and the technology indicator while the rule
of law is interacted with contract intensity. These interactions are included because several
studies on institutions and trade have stressed the importance of financial development and
judicial quality as sources of comparative advantage in R&D and contract intensive indus-
tries.30 Moreover, prior research has emphasized the quality of intellectual property rights as
determinant of FDI flows in industrial sectors being sensitive to the protection of intellectual
property.31 The coefficient of interest remains stable in size and significant. Overall, the con-
trol variables are in line with economic theory. The interactions of patent protection and the
high-technology dummy as well as the interaction of the rule of law and contract intensity are
both positive and significant. Hence, these results are in line with previous studies on insti-
tution driven comparative advantage. Information technology infrastructure however might
be determined by both, a country’s skill and capital endowment. In order to take account of
this relationship I control for the interactions of skill as well as capital endowment and my
measure for complexity in column (4). The coefficient of interest is stable in size and remains
significant at the 5% level. The skill endowment interaction is likewise positive and signifi-
cant, whereas this is not the case for the capital endowment interaction. Ultimately, I aim
to control for the overall level of economic development and for a country’s integration in the
30See e.g. Beck (2003), Berkowitz, Moenius, and Pistor (2006), Nunn (2007), Levchenko (2007) and Carluccio
and Fally (2012).
31See e.g. Javorcik (2004), Branstetter, Fisman, Foley, and Saggi (2011) and Bilir (2014).
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world economy. Therefore I include per capita GDP and openness and interact both measures
with product complexity in column (5). The two variables are positively correlated with the
international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user. The additional interaction term
based on openness is positive and significant. Most importantly however, the main coefficient
for information technology remains unaffected, robust and significant.32
The empirical strategy might nevertheless create doubts on the direction of causality. An
argument that could be advanced is that US sourcing activities might trigger economic growth
which might drive demand for more sophisticated information technology. Similarly, foreign
firms might have an incentive to lobby for improvements in local information technology in-
frastructure. These effects might be systematically driven by complex industries which rely to
a larger extent on efficient information transmission. Following this reasoning, the estimated
coefficient of interest might therefore be subject to an upward bias induced by reverse causal-
ity. The sign of the coefficient would however still be correct and in line with the empirical
prediction. Nevertheless, if demand for information technology adoption is independent from
sector specific product complexity, these effects are captured by the country-year fixed effects
and the coefficient of interest can be interpreted as causal.
Considering the size of the effect of information technology, I compare two industries that
differ in one standard deviation in terms of complexity (i.e. intensity in non-routine tasks).
Based on the coefficient in column (2), I then calculate the differential effect of a one standard
deviation change in information technology (i.e. international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per
internet user) on the number of imported goods. This results in a differential effect of about
2,35%. This appears to be a noticeable effect, given that the effect of skill endowment with
respect to industries that differ by one standard deviation in skill intensity is about 3,02%.
3.2.2 Robustness
I perform different robustness checks to test the validity of the results. In Table 7, I estimate
the baseline specification with alternative OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the
32Throughout all specifications, the estimated overdispersion parameter alpha is about 0.08 and the
likelihood-ratio test for alpha = 0 is rejected. This implies that the variance of the residuals is larger than the
mean and the residuals do not follow a Poisson distribution.
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logarithm of the number of imported inputs. Additionally, standard errors are now two-way
clustered at the country and sector level. Results given in Table 6 indicate that the coefficient
of interest remains unaffected. Finally, in order to check that results are not sensitive to
outliers, I restrict the sample to the 75% percentile of the distribution of the number of
imported goods. This amounts to restricting the maximum number of imported inputs to
6 imported goods. I obtain significant coefficients that are smaller than those in the full
sample, reducing the concern of industry-country combinations importing a larger number of
inputs driving the results (see Table 8). Table 9 presents various additional specifications
based on the negative binomial regression. First of all, in columns (1) to (3) I control for the
interaction of institutional determinants and the measure for complexity. The coefficient of
interest remains positive and significant. Afterwards I substitute the complexity measure with
routine intensity. Following Prediction 1, the number of imported goods increases with the level
of information technology for more complex inputs. Consequently, the effect of information
technology is expected to decrease for industries that are more basic in nature as they rely to
a lesser extent on information transmission. The coefficients in columns (4) and (5) are both
negative. However, only the former is statistically significant. Finally, throughout columns (6)
to (7) I use alternative measures of information technology given by the international internet
bandwidth (bit/s), the amount of internet users as well as the amount of secure internet
servers relative to the population. The regressions yield a positive and significant coefficient
of interest. Altogether, the results confirm that the country of origin’s level of information
technology is strongly correlated with the number of imported inputs in complex industries
compared to basic industries.
3.3 Information Technology and the Mode of Organization
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy and Results
So far, I have tested Prediction 1 by analyzing the impact of information technology and the
complexity of traded intermediates on the number of imported inputs. I now turn towards
Prediction 2 and the effect of information technology on the optimal mode of organization.
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Prediction 2 states that more efficient information technology should lead to a larger fraction
of arm’s-length contracting compared to FDI, with the effect being larger for more complex
industries. The dependent variable is therefore now given by the share of intra-firm trade by
industry and country in order to measure the optimal organizational mode of an industry.
Again, the empirical strategy follows the difference-in-differences approach taken in the pre-
vious section. This allows once more to focus on the interaction terms and to control for all
unobserved sector characteristics and country characteristics that vary across years by means
of fixed effects. The estimation equation is now given by
IntraSharecst = β2 × complexitys × ITct +X
′
cst
γ + µs + ηct + εcst, (23)
where IntraSharecst reflects the share of intra-firm trade, complexitys denotes the mea-
sure of complexity (i.e. intensity in non-routine tasks) and ITct is the level of information
technology represented by the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user. In
addition, the specification employs sector and country-year fixed effects µs and ηct and controls
for observable factors Xcst that might have an impact on information technology and product
complexity as well as the share of intra-firm trade. Hence, identification is again based on
variation across industries within countries for a given year. Following Prediction 2, the coeffi-
cient of interest β2 is expected to be negative: Higher levels of information technology resolve
contractual frictions in arm’s-length relationships by reducing the inefficiencies due to imper-
fect knowledge transfer and raise the amount of market transactions. The effect is supposed
to increase with the complexity of industries. All regressions are based on robust standard
errors which are corrected for clusters by sector as well as by country-year combination.
Results are presented in Table 2. As before, the coefficient of interest is the interaction
of information technology and product complexity. The coefficient in column (1) is negative
and significant. Moreover, the coefficient is robust to the inclusion of the full set of sector and
country-year fixed effects as well as to controls for traditional determinants of comparative
advantage given by the interaction of relative factor endowments and factor intensities. Hence,
a higher level of information technology in the country of origin reduces the share of related
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OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: share of intra-firm trade
complexitys * ITct -0.0205*** -0.0206*** -0.0167* -0.0194*** -0.0245***
(0.00705) (0.00708) (0.00842) (0.00714) (0.00819)
R&D ints * fin devtct -0.000427*
(0.000220)
high-techs * patent protc -0.0443
(0.0414)
R&D ints * rule of lawct 0.211***
(0.0330)
contract ints * rule of lawct -0.226
(0.141)
capitals * ITct -0.0237
(0.0201)
capital ints * rule of lawct 0.370**
(0.165)
complexitys * opennessct 0.00107**
(0.000416)
complexitys * cgdpct 2.40e-06
(4.09e-06)
skill ints * H/Lc 0.121 0.129 0.190 0.104 -0.0589
(0.165) (0.166) (0.234) (0.163) (0.194)
capital ints * K/Lc -0.0165 -0.0168 -0.0417 -0.0232 -0.0178
(0.0299) (0.0302) (0.0410) (0.0268) (0.0301)
sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
country-year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 10,926 10,926 7,043 10,926 10,915
R-squared 0.286 0.287 0.320 0.287 0.289
sector clusters 85 85 85 85 85
country-year clusters 314 314 192 314 313
Notes: Robust standard errors two-way clustered by sector and country-year. The dependent
variable is the share of intra-firm trade. The coefficient of interest is the interaction of com-
plexity at the sector level complexitys and the level of information technology infrastructure at
the country-year level IT ct . Information technology infrastructure is measured by the interna-
tional internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user. Complexity is measured by the intensity
in non-routine tasks by industry (see section 3.1.3 for detailed explanations). For a definition
of the covariates see Table 12. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2: Prediction 2 - The Impact of Information Technology and Complexity
on the Sourcing Mode
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party imports. The relationship is stronger in more complex industries relying to a larger
extent on efficient codification and transmission of information. In column (2) I add the
interaction of R&D intensity and financial development. The main coefficient of interest
remains negative and significant. Besides, the additional control variable is negative and
significant and in line with Carluccio and Fally (2012) who find that R&D intensive inputs are
more likely to be traded intra-firm from countries with a lower level of financial development.
Subsequently, I add controls for further institutional determinants in column (3) by including
interactions of the technology indicator, R&D and contract intensity and the level of patent
protection and the quality of the legal system. The enforcement of intellectual property
rights might drive firms’ decisions whether to outsource or integrate if they are subject to
technological imitation. Next, firms’ organizational decisions might be affected by the quality
level of the judicial system. My coefficient of interest reduces in size and loses some of its
statistical significance while the number of observations in the estimation drops considerably.
Nevertheless, the coefficient remains negative and statistically different from zero in line with
Prediction 2. The coefficients of patent protection and the interaction of contract intensity
and the rule of law are insignificant. The interaction based on R&D intensity and the rule of
law however is positive and significant which is in line with the idea of rule of law effects being
larger in more contract dependent industries (see Antràs and Helpman (2008)). In column
(4) I control for the interactions of capital intensity and information technology as well as the
rule of law, respectively. Capital intensity is intended to reflect the headquarter intensity of
the industry. The coefficient of interest is unaffected and stays negative and highly significant.
This suggests, that the impact of information technology on the sourcing mode is not driven
by the overall level of contract enforcement and further institutional determinants. In a final
step, I add controls in order to account for the degree of openness of the country of origin
and its level of economic development. My main coefficient of interest is again robust to the
controls and shows up negative in line with Prediction 2.33
As in section 3.2.1 my estimation results might suffer from reverse causality. The share
33My result of information technology being negatively related with the share of intra-firm trade is consistent
with Bloom, Garicano, Sadun, and van Reenen (2014) who find the adoption of information technology at the
firm level to be positively associated with more decentralized decision making within firms.
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of goods purchased from integrated suppliers by multinational firms might systematically
affect the level of information technology adoption where the effect might be induced by
more complex industries that are more dependent on sophisticated information technology
infrastructure. Nevertheless, it is a priori not clear by what mechanism this might take place
for which reason the direction of the potential reverse causality bias is not obvious.
Based on the coefficient in column (1) and a comparison of two industries that differ in one
standard deviation in their level of complexity, a one standard deviation increase in information
technology creates a negative differential effect of about 1, 11 percentage points in the share
of intra-firm trade.
3.3.2 Robustness
I engage in various robustness tests to evaluate the validity of the results (see Table 10).
First, I replace the sectoral degree of product complexity with routine intensity. More routine
intensive industries are less dependent on efficient information transmission. In this regard,
Prediction 2 implies a positive coefficient of interest. Throughout columns (1) to (3) I control
for Heckscher-Ohlin effects as well as institutional determinants. Across all specifications, the
new coefficient of interest is positive and significant. Thus, information technology reduces
the share of intra-firm trade with a less pronounced effect for routine intensive industries. In
columns (4) and (5) I resort again to my main measure of complexity and control directly
for the interaction of complexity and institutional determinants. Sign and significance of the
main coefficient are unaffected. A possible problem of the estimations so far might be that the
dependent variable is given by a share that is bounded between zero and one. Therefore, in
column (6) the dependent variable is replaced with a dummy variable indicating whether the
share of intra-firm trade is above the 90% percentile of the distribution in order to estimate a
linear probability model. Again, the main result is stable showing a negative and significant
coefficient of interest.34
34Replacing the share of intra-firm trade in the baseline regression in Table 2 with the integration indicator
as dependent variable yields a negative and significant coefficient of interest throughout all specifications.
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4 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of the advances in information technology on the global sourc-
ing decisions of multinationals. While previous research has found large spatial barriers to
knowledge transmission across borders, the impact of the digitization of the business world on
the global supply chain has received only little attention.
In order to guide the empirical analysis, I provide a model based on the product cycle the-
ory by Antràs (2005) which illustrates the impact of information technology on the geography
of offshoring and the sourcing mode. More sophisticated information technology allows more
efficient knowledge transmission between the headquarter firm in North and its supplier in
South by alleviating contractual distortions. Overall, imperfect information transmission in-
duces larger disruptions in the production process of more complex industries. This yields two
predictions. Firstly, industries which are more intensive in complex and non-routine intensive
activities are more likely to offshore parts of their production process to countries with high
levels in information technology infrastructure. Secondly, information technology is expected
to reduce the share of intra-firm trade with the effect being larger for more knowledge intensive
industries. The paper provides empirical evidence in support of these hypotheses by combin-
ing data on the number of imported goods and the share of intra-firm imports with data on
the international internet bandwidth by country and the intensity in non-routine production
activities by industry. The measure of sectoral complexity and non-routine intensity is based
on data at the occupational level. The empirical strategy concentrates on the identification
of the interaction of information technology and product complexity which allows making use
of a generalized difference-in-differences approach with fixed effects along the industry and
country-year dimension. Econometric results are in line with the empirical predictions. US
firms find it more profitable to offshore the production of complex intermediates to South-
ern countries with higher levels of information technology infrastructure. In equal measure,
information technology creates incentives to engage in arm’s-length contracting with the re-
lationship being stronger in more complex industries. Estimates suggest that a one standard
deviation change in information technology yields a differential effect of about 2, 35% in the
34
number of imported intermediates and a differential reduction of about 1.11 percentage points
in the share of intra-firm trade when comparing two industries that differ by one standard
deviation in terms of product complexity. The econometric estimates remain persistent in the
presence of alternative determinants of the patterns of global sourcing and firm organization
such as factor endowments, institutions and economic development.
Altogether, the paper highlights the effects of information technology adoption for the
patterns of trade and the mode of firm organization along the global supply chain. Prior
research has primarily hinted to the importance of skill endowments as well as contracting
and financial institutions in shaping the location decisions of multinationals. Nevertheless,
given that the development of human capital and trustworthy institutions takes a long time,
the adoption of information technology might be a particularly viable economic policy for
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Figure 2: The Impact of Information Technology on the Sourcing Mode
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B Tables
Table 3: List of Countries in the Data
Algeria Czech Republic Indonesia Mozambique South Africa
Bangladesh Djibouti Iran Nepal Sri Lanka
Barbados Dominican Rep. Iraq Nicaragua Suriname
Belize Ecuador Jamaica Niger Tanzania
Benin Egypt Jordan Nigeria Thailand
Bolivia Ethiopia Kenya Pakistan Togo
Brazil Fiji Korea (Rep. of) Panama Trinidad and Tobago
Bulgaria Gabon Lao P.D.R. Paraguay Tunisia
Burkina Faso Gambia Liberia Peru Turkey
Burundi Ghana Madagascar Philippines Uganda
Cameroon Guatemala Malawi Poland Uruguay
Chad Guinea Malaysia Portugal Venezuela
Chile Guinea-Bissau Mali Romania Yemen
China Guyana Mauritania Rwanda Zambia
Colombia Haiti Mauritius Samoa Zimbabwe
D.R. Congo Honduras Mexico Senegal
Costa Rica Hungary Mongolia Seychelles
Cote d’Ivoire India Morocco Sierra Leone
Table 4: Top and Bottom 10 Countries in Information Technology Infrastructure
Top 10 Bottom 10
country IT country IT
Hungary 8.144 Guinea-Bissau 0.019
Czech Republic 8.045 Guinea 0.040
Jamaica 6.884 Congo D.R. 0.053
Djibouti 5.757 Zimbabwe 0.055
Portugal 3.918 Nigeria 0.068
Barbados 3.481 Chad 0.074
Panama 3.094 Zambia 0.085
Romania 2.819 Kenya 0.100
Chile 2.819 Pakistan 0.102
Colombia 2.787 Malawi 0.105
Notes: Information technology is given by the average international inter-
net bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user over the 2002 - 2006 period. Data
is derived from the ICT indicators database by the International Telecom-
munication Union.
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develop objectives 0.84 1.00
(0.00)
computers 0.83 0.93 1.00
(0.00) (0.00)
solve problems 0.87 0.65 0.64 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
consultation 0.82 0.93 0.96 0.67 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
creativity 0.67 0.73 0.77 0.57 0.77 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
complexity 0.91 0.95 0.97 0.77 0.97 0.84 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
handle objects -0.74 -0.88 -0.88 -0.57 -0.88 -0.61 -0.86 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
control machines -0.55 -0.84 -0.84 -0.36 -0.86 -0.61 -0.78 0.89 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
physical activities -0.80 -0.85 -0.89 -0.64 -0.88 -0.79 -0.91 0.88 0.77 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
routine int -0.74 -0.91 -0.92 -0.56 -0.92 -0.71 -0.90 0.98 0.93 0.94 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: p-values in parentheses. For a detailed exposition of the construction of task intensities and measures of complexity and routine intensity see section 3.1.3.
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Table 6: Top and and Bottom 10 Most and Least Complex Industries
Top 10 Most Complex Industries
NAICS 4-digit sector description complexity
3341 computer and peripheral equipment 2.901
3345 navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control instruments 2.850
3342 communications equipment 2.763
3364 aerospace product and parts 2.740
3344 semiconductor and other electronic component 2.676
3333 commercial and cervice industry machinery 2.583
3332 industrial machinery 2.581
3343 audio and video equipment 2.550
3254 pharmaceutical and medicine 2.520
3339 other general purpose machinery 2.472
Bottom 10 Least Complex Industrises
NAICS 4-digit sector description complexity
3116 animal slaughtering and processing 1.326
3273 cement and concrete product manufacturing 1.564
3211 sawmills and wood preservation 1.719
3115 dairy product manufacturing 1.733
3131 fiber, yarn, and thread mills 1.754
3114 fruit and vegetable preserving and specialty food manufacturing 1.767
3274 lime and gypsum product manufacturing 1.792
3222 converted paper product manufacturing 1.797
3122 tobacco manufacturing 1.807
3119 other food manufacturing 1.811
Notes: Complexity is measured by the intensity in non-routine tasks by industry. See section 3.1.3 for
detailed explanations on the construction of task intensities and the measure for complexity.
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OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: log(number of imported goods)
complexitys * ITct 0.0615*** 0.0550*** 0.0414** 0.0401*** 0.0361***
(0.0167) (0.0164) (0.0173) (0.0108) (0.0126)
R&D ints * fin devtct 0.000130
(0.000560)
high-techs * patent protc 0.125
(0.0935)
contract ints * rule of lawct 2.013***
(0.692)
complexitys * H/Lc 1.075**
(0.506)




complexitys * opennessct 0.00344***
(0.00127)
skill ints * H/Lc 0.264 -0.372 -2.171 -0.609
(0.892) (0.747) (1.547) (0.836)
capital ints * K/Lc 0.421* 0.438** 0.452* 0.431*
(0.232) (0.211) (0.234) (0.229)
sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
country-year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 10,007 9,566 9,270 9,566 9,549
R-squared 0.716 0.725 0.733 0.727 0.728
sector clusters 73 73 73 73 73
country clusters 85 75 67 75 75
Notes: Robust standard errors two-way clustered by sector and country. The dependent vari-
able is the natural log of the number of imported goods. The coefficient of interest is the
interaction of complexity at the sector level complexitys and the level of information tech-
nology infrastructure at the country-year level IT ct . Information technology infrastructure
is measured by the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user. Complexity
is measured by the intensity in non-routine tasks by industry (see section 3.1.3 for detailed
explanations). For a definition of the covariates see Table 12. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Prediction 1 - Impact of Information Technology and Complexity on the
Geography of Imports. Robustness Check 1 - OLS Regression
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OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: log(number of imported goods)
complexitys * ITct 0.0442*** 0.0356*** 0.0278** 0.0264** 0.0218*
(0.0126) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0110) (0.0115)
R&D ints * fin devtct 0.000515
(0.000529)
high-techs * patent protc 0.102
(0.0650)
contract ints * rule of lawct 0.956**
(0.458)
complexitys * H/Lc 0.517
(0.370)
complexitys * K/Lc 0.0228
(0.0348)
complexitys * cgdpct 1.51e-05*
(8.09e-06)
complexitys * opennessct 0.00158**
(0.000726)
skill ints * H/Lc 0.598 0.0384 -0.729 -0.0438
(0.461) (0.502) (0.945) (0.488)
capital ints * K/Lc 0.122 0.118 0.135 0.128
(0.0826) (0.0776) (0.0811) (0.0796)
sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
country-year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 7,582 7,185 6,891 7,185 7,168
R-squared 0.472 0.479 0.486 0.480 0.483
sector clusters 73 73 73 73 73
country clusters 85 75 67 75 75
Notes: Robust standard errors two-way clustered by sector and country. The dependent vari-
able is the natural log of the number of imported goods which is restricted to the 75% percentile
of the distribution (i.e. 6 imported goods). The coefficient of interest is the interaction of com-
plexity at the sector level complexitys and the level of information technology infrastructure at
the country-year level IT ct . Information technology infrastructure is measured by the interna-
tional internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user. Complexity is measured by the intensity
in non-routine tasks by industry (see section 3.1.3 for detailed explanations). For a definition
of the covariates see Table 12. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Prediction 1 - Impact of Information Technology and Complexity on
the Geography of Imports. Robustness Check 2 - Number of Imported Goods
Restricted to the 75% Percentile. OLS Regression
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negative binomial regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: number of imported goods







complexitys * ITct 0.0469** 0.0316* 0.0333* 1.513*** 0.00665** 0.00372***
(0.0196) (0.0169) (0.0173) (0.477) (0.00321) (0.000997)
routine ints * ITct -0.0152** -0.00688
(0.00599) (0.00517)
complexitys * fin devtct 0.00108
(0.00111)
complexitys * patent protc 0.175**
(0.0839)
complexitys * rule of lawct 0.817**
(0.413)
skill ints * H/Lc 0.961 0.784 0.585 1.348** 0.909 0.861 1.512**
(0.733) (0.797) (0.791) (0.645) (0.702) (0.720) (0.620)
capital ints * K/Lc 0.247 0.236 0.249 0.239 0.248 0.258 0.191
(0.290) (0.292) (0.292) (0.290) (0.292) (0.272) (0.293)
alpha 0.0877 0.0868 0.0874 0.0909 0.0880 0.0889 0.0890 0.0895
sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country-year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 9,565 9,284 9,573 10,014 9,573 9,644 10,056 7,852
log likelihood -20,111 -19,668 -20,115 -20,954 -20,136 -20,276 -21,054 -16,630
country clusters 76 68 76 86 76 77 76 73
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country. The dependent variable is the number of imported goods. In columns (1) - (3) and (6) - (8)
the coefficient of interest is the interaction of complexity at the sector level complexitys and the level of information technology infrastructure at
the country-year level IT ct . In columns (4) - (5) the coefficient of interest is based on routine intensity at the sector level routine ints. Complexity
and routine intensity are measured by the intensity in non-routine and routine tasks by industry (see section 3.1.3 for detailed explanations).
In columns (1) - (5) information technology infrastructure is measured by the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user. In
columns (6) - (9) the measure is replaced by the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per capita, the share of internet users per 100 people
and the number of secure servers per 1 million people. For a definition of the covariates see Table 12. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9: Prediction 1 - Impact of Information Technology and Complexity on the Geography of Imports. Robustness
Check 3 - Routine Intensity, Institutions and Alternative Measures of Information Technology
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OLS LPM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: share of intra-firm trade integration
routine ints * ITct 0.00719*** 0.00724*** 0.00708**
(0.00242) (0.00243) (0.00292)
complexitys * ITct -0.0188*** -0.0181** -0.0168**
(0.00683) (0.00846) (0.00802)
R&D ints * fin devtct -0.000433*
(0.000220)
complexitys * fin devtct 0.00107**
(0.000461)
high-techs * patent protc -0.0420
(0.0415)
complexitys * patent protc -0.0864
(0.0565)
R&D ints * rule of lawct 0.211***
(0.0339)
contract ints * rule of lawct -0.242*
(0.142)
complexitys * rule of lawct 0.389**
(0.150)
skill ints * H/Lc 0.129 0.138 0.221 -0.0104 0.0590 0.174
(0.166) (0.167) (0.240) (0.169) (0.256) (0.183)
capital ints * K/Lc -0.0122 -0.0124 -0.0371 -0.0172 -0.0446 0.00767
(0.0297) (0.0299) (0.0407) (0.0301) (0.0398) (0.0305)
sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
country-year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 10,926 10,926 7,043 10,926 7,043 10,926
R-squared 0.286 0.287 0.320 0.288 0.321 0.148
sector clusters 85 85 85 85 85 85
country-year clusters 314 314 192 314 192 314
Notes: Robust standard errors two-way clustered by sector and country-year. In columns (1) - (5) the
dependent variable is the share of intra-firm trade. In column (6) the dependent variable integration is a
dummy variable indicating whether the share of intra-firm trade is above the 90%-percentile of the distribu-
tion. In columns (1) - (3) the coefficient of interest is the interaction of routine intensity at the sector level
routine ints and the level of information technology infrastructure at the country-year level IT ct . In columns
(4) - (6) the coefficient of interest is based on complexity at the sector level complexitys. Complexity and
routine intensiy are measured by the intensity in non-routine and routine tasks by industry (see section 3.1.3
for detailed explanations). Information technology infrastructure is measured by the international internet
bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet user. For a definition of the covariates see Table 12. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
Table 10: Prediction 2 - The Impact of Information Technology and Complexity
on the Sourcing Mode. Robustness Check: Routine Intensity, Institutions and
Linear Probability Model
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Table 11: Summary Statistics
variable observations mean min max std. dev.
global sourcing
number of imported goodscst 10682 6.123104 1 213 12.28056
log(number of imported goods)cst 10682 1.097822 0 5.361292 1.067945
share of intra-firm tradecst 11902 0.2746167 0.0000196 0.9997116 0.2813905
integration indicatorcst 11902 0.0999832 0 1 0.2999902
country level
int’l internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per internet userct 391 1.071124 0.0023679 12.48208 1.732975
int’l internet bandwidth (bit/s) per capitact 402 0.0175254 4.50E-06 0.4671284 0.0496992
share of internet users per 100 peoplect 420 9.057331 0.0310112 78.1 12.69666
secure servers per 1 million peoplect 291 17.15283 0.0071846 520.0945 55.04144
financial developmentct 427 32.90474 0.7735366 163.369 31.35263
rule of lawct 433 0.4154873 0.118 0.79 0.1442786
opennessct 427 77.23927 21.67383 290.4993 39.01523
per capita gdpct 433 6208.162 405.4827 27044.03 5544.011
patent protectionc 74 3.124324 1.78 4.54 0.7115526
H/Lc 77 0.482419 0.07236 1.127 0.2397439
K/Lc 77 8.663346 5.76262 10.66226 1.362734
sector level
complexitys 73 2.09736 1.32669 2.901543 0.3050399
routine ints 73 4.500416 2.254529 6.621832 0.836662
R&D ints 73 0.0588022 0 2.665776 0.312024
high-techs 73 0.260274 0 1 0.4418206
contract intensitys 73 0.8546387 0.0959204 0.9995984 0.1862124
skill ints 73 0.2799016 0.0969529 0.6265237 0.1124233
capital ints 73 0.140219 0.0155472 0.8833231 0.1412792
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Table 12: Variables: Description and Sources
variables descriptions and sources
number of imported goodscst Number of 5-digit SITC products by 4-digit NAICS industry which are imported to the US. Raw materials
and final goods are dropped according to the end-use classification following Feenstra and Jensen (2012). The
sample is based on countries that exhibit per capita GDP (at PPP) of less than 50% of the US level in the
year 2000. Data is derived from the NBER trade database.
log(number of imported goods)cst Natural logarithm of the number of 5-digit SITC products by 4-digit NAICS industry which are imported to
the US. See above for further explanations.
share of intra-firm tradecst Share of related party transactions in both related and non-related party transactions of US imports at the
4-digit NAICS level. A related party transaction is defined as a transaction between two parties in which one
owns at least 6% of the outstanding voting stock or shares of its counterpart. The sample is based on countries
that exhibit per capita GDP (at PPP) of less than 50% of the US level in the year 2000. Data is from the US
Census Bureau. For a discussion of the data see 3.1.1.
integrationcst Dummy variable that indicates whether the share of intra-firm trade is above the 90% percentile of the
distribution. See above for further explanations.
ITct Information technology infrastructure is measured by the international internet bandwidth (kbit/s) per
internet user. Alternative measures are the international internet bandwith (bit/s) per capita, the share of
internet users per 100 people and the number of secure servers per 1 million people. Data for the first three
measures is from the ICT indicators database by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Data on
secure servers is from the World Development Indicators (World Bank).
financial developmentct Domestic credit to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions as a share of GDP. Data is from
the Global Financial Development Database (World Bank).
rule of lawct Index of the quality of contract enforcement, the protection of property rights, the police, and the courts as
well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Data is from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 2013 .
opennessct Ratio of the sum of imports and exports over GDP taken from the World Development Indicators (World
Bank).
per capita gdpct GDP per capita at PPP and current international Dollar taken from the World Development Indicators
(World Bank).
patent protectionc Index of the protection of patent rights developed by Ginarte and Park (1997, 2008) for the year 2005.
H/Lc Natural logarithm of human capital augmented labor relative to total labor which is based on estimations of
the returns to schooling by Hall and Jones (1999) .
K/Lc Natural logarithm of physical capital relative to total labor. See Hall and Jones (1999) for more detailed
explanations.
complexitys Reflects the intensity in non-routine tasks by industry. Task intensities are contructed based on worker and
job characteristics provided by the Department of Labor’s Occupational Information Network (O*NET) for
about 800 occupations. The task measures are aggregated to the 4-digit NAICS industry level by weighting
them with employment shares from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics . Data is for the year 2000. complexitys is the average of selected tasks representing non-routine
activities. See 3.1.3 for a detailed explanation.
routine intensitys Reflects the intensity in routine tasks by industry at the 4-digit NAICS level. Routine intensity is the average
of selected tasks representing routine activities. See section 3.1.3 and above for more detailed explanations.
R&D intensitys R&D expenditures over sales at the 4-digit NAICS level taken from Keller and Yeaple (2013). The measure is
based on firm-level data from COMPUSTAT .
high-tech indicators Dummy variable indicating whether a 4-digit NAICS sector represents a high-technology industry. Data is
from the Science and Engineering Indicators 2010 by the National Science Foundation. The classification is
based on the intensity of high-technology empoyment within an industry. An industry is considered a
high-technology industry if employment in technology-oriented occupations (scientific, engineering and
technician occupations) accounts for a proportion of that industry’s total employment that is more than twice
the average for all industries.
contract intensitys Reflects the share of inputs that are relationship-specific. The measure is based on the proportion of inputs of
products that are not traded on organized exchanges but which might be reference priced based on the liberal
classification of commodities into organized exchange, reference priced, and differentiated by Rauch (1999).
The data is aggregated to the 4-digit NAICS level by means of the BEA’s input-output table on input use. See
Nunn (2007) for a detailed exposition.
skill intensitys Share of non-production workers in total employment at the 4-digit NAICS level. Data is from the NBER
CES Manufacturing Industry Database.




Profit Maximization with Manufacturing Firm in North
The headquarter firm’s optimization problem is given by
max
h,m








− hwN −mwS . (24)




z . Plugging this back into the first order conditions, one can solve for the first best















Inserting the first best investment levels into the profit function given in equation (1)
yields:








Profit Maximization with Manufacturing Firm in South
Headquarter firm and manufacturing firm first choose their investment level in non-contractible






























































































, s ∈ (µ, 1]. (33)
Plugging non-contractible headquarter and manufacturing activities into revenues R and

























with ξαz = (1− z)
−(1−z)z−z.
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Solving for the level of non-contractible headquarter activities h:























Solving for the level of non-contractible manufacturing activities m (s) s ∈ (µ,1]:























Solving for the level of contractible activities on behalf of the manufacturing firm:










m(s)ds+ T ≥ 0. (37)
The participation constraint is satisfied with equality and the final good producer chooses
a contract that maximizes its payoff φR− wNh− T :
max
{m(s)}µ0









This can be rewritten as:
max
{m(s)}µ0




m(s)ds− wSΓ(1− µ)m(s). (39)
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Plugging in the first order conditions characterizing non-contractible investments yields:
max
{m(s)}µ0





The first order condition of the profit maximization problem is given by:
∂π
∂m(s)
= [1− (1− z)φα− z(1− µ)(1− φ)]
∂R
∂m(s)







m(s)−1R , s ∈ [0, µ] . (42)
Contractible investments can then be expressed by:
m(s) =





Inserting revenues R from equation (34), solving for m(s) with s ∈ [0, µ] and rearranging
finally gives the level of contractible investments in manufacturing:
m(s) =
{






















From equation (40) profits can be rewritten as
π = [1− (1− z)φα− z (1− µ) (1− φ)]R− wSµm(s) , s ∈ [0, µ] . (45)
Plugging in contractible investments from equation (43):
π = (1− α)
(





Profits can now be derived by combining contractible investments from equation (44) with


























Combining this with equation (46) and setting θ = (1− µz) finally yields:















• φ = 0.5














• φ = 0.5 (1 + δα)













with △ = [1− α0.5 (θ + δα (1− z (2− µ)))].
Location Choice: The A(z, µ,Γ)-curve














Γ(1−µ) ≡ A(z, µ,Γ). (52)














A(z, µ,Γ) = +∞, (54)





0.5α(1−µz)(1− α0.5 (1− µz))(1−α(1−µz))
)
=
(1− α (1− µ))(1−α(1−µ))








(1− α (1− µ))(1−α(1−µ))
0.5α(1−µ) (1− α0.5(1− µ))(1−α(1−µ)
)
Γ1−µ > 1, (56)
since Γ > 1. Most importantly, note that f(b) = (1− ab)1−a ba is increasing in b for




is large enough, a cutoff z̄ ∈ (0, 1) emerges such that for z < z profits with
Northern manufacturing are larger than profits with Southern manufacturing πN > πS . Thus,
for any z > z manufacturing in South is more profitable πN < πS .
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Mode of Organization: The A∗(z, µ,Γ)-curve





which can be rearranged to obtain
A∗(z, µ,Γ) ≡
(




Γ1−µ ≥ 1, (58)
with △ = [1− α0.5 (θ + δα (1− z (2− µ)))].
A⋆(z, µ,Γ) is a decreasing function of z since
lim
z→0
(1− δα)αz(1−µ)(1 + δα)α(1−z) [1− α0.5 (θ + δα (1− z (2− µ)))](1−αθ)
(1− α0.5θ)(1−αθ)
=











(1− δα)αz(1−µ)(1 + δα)α(1−z) [1− α0.5 (θ + δα (1− z (2− µ)))](1−αθ)
(1− α0.5θ)(1−αθ)
=
(1− δα)α(1−µ) (1− α0.5 (1− δα) (1− µ))(1−α(1−µ))









(1− δα)α(1−µ) (1− α0.5 (1− δα) (1− µ))(1−α(1−µ))
(1− α0.5 (1− µ))(1−α(1−µ))
) 1
α
Γ1−µ < 1, (62)
if Γ is not too large. Again, note that this is because f(b) = (1− ab)1−a ba is increasing in
b for b ∈ (0, 1) and a ∈ (0, 1) . Hence, ∃ z ∈ (0, 1) such that πO (z∗) = πV I (z∗).
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